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“It would seem that the tail of privatization has begun to wag the proverbial dog of
adjudication.”1 – Professor Thomas E. Carbonneau

“No perfect procedure is likely to be discovered. For persons engaged in planning and drafting
international commercial agreements, one thing is clear. To the extent that the parties do not
choose a method of dispute resolution on their own, one will be imposed on them whenever a
dispute arises under the contract.”2 – Professor William F. Fox

1. Introduction
International commercial arbitration (“ICA”) is the preferred method of dispute
resolution for commercial entities.3 The main advantages are perceived to be enforceability,
avoidance of specific legal systems and national courts, flexibility, and the ability of parties to
select their arbitrators.4 Notwithstanding these advantages, a twenty-first century ICA is tainted
with a few shortcomings. The procedure is perceived to be too costly and lacking the expected
speed.5
The two mentioned disadvantages have supposedly been a result of ICA becoming
“judicialized” (or “Americanized”6). Some may even claim that ICA has become merely a “new
litigation venue”.7 Put differently, the procedure has supposedly turned out to be much more
1 THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CARBONNEAU ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED ESSAYS 138 (Juris Net
2010).
2 WILLIAM F. FOX, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 88 (Wolters
Kluwer, 6th ed. 2018).
3 White & Case and Queen Marry School of International Arbitration, 2018 International Arbitration
Survey:
the
Evolution
of
International
Arbitration
at
https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/qmul-international-arbitrationsurvey-2018-19.pdf.

2,

4 Id. I would add here that its utility is also a manifestation of globalization and liberal capitalism. I usually refer
to this development as a “post world-war II virtue.” See e.g. CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 7-8. (“In its
contemporary embodiment, ICA emerged soon after the Second World War—more than likely, as part of Western
efforts to export the virtues of capitalism and to maintain the unity and develop the prosperity of the free world
alliance.”).
5 Id.
6 See CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 137 (“In their uniquely adaptive manner, the American common law and the
American common law lawyer have adapted to the emergence of arbitration.”).
7 See e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation”, 1 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) and Irina
Tymczyszyn, Using Fast Track Arbitration for Resolving Commercial Dispute, 6 CORP. AND COM. DISP. REV. 1,
25 (2018) (“International arbitration, which initially developed as an efficient and flexible form of dispute
resolution, is no longer considered to be a faster and cheaper alternative to court proceedings. Paradoxically,
according to a recent PWC survey, almost a quarter of their respondents (22 percent) across all industry sectors
stated that arbitration was more costly than other methods of dispute resolution and almost a fifth of respondents
(17 percent) found that the arbitration often took longer than the available alternatives.”). See also Paulsson, FastTrack Arbitration in Europe (With Special Reference to the WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules), 18 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 713, 713 (1995) (“Arbitration, they say, has become too cumbersome, too expensive, and
too legalistic-in sum, too contaminated by the habits of court litigation.”).
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“court-like” than what its users had expected. Thus, today, ICA stands in stark contrast to what
the procedure looked like when it was initially developed in continental Europe in the early
twentieth-century.8 As a result, one can claim that ICA is “functioning in a manner untrue to its
original character [and therefore] finds itself entrapped by the error of practices that it was
meant to rectify.”9 For these reasons, in this paper I shall refer to the current ICA procedure as
an “arbitral trial”; that is, an arbitral legal order that has shaken-off many of its old ideals and
instead cloaked itself in many features and characteristics traditionally belonging exclusively
to ordinary, adversarial, court litigation.
In this paper, I highlight three manifestations of judicialization vis-á-vis ICA; that is, (1)
the “procedural judicialization”; (2) the “court judicialization”; and (3) the “institutional
judicialization”. In this light, I argue that there are both positive and negative aspects of such
judicialization, seen in each of the three manifestations. Furthermore, I observe that
international law has become fragmented, and therefore in need of specialized, tailor-made,
procedural solutions.
First, procedural judicialization is not entirely a negative development, but rather a
normal evolution of melding and harmonizing judicial cultures, as well as a result of
fragmentation (e.g., the widened subject-matter arbitrability) and the increased high-stake and
complex disputes adjudicated through arbitration. Moreover, procedural judicialization can
improve the quality of the arbitral procedure (and therefore its legitimacy forms an empirical
epistemic authority standpoint).10 That said, the adoption of (American) trial techniques may
not be vital and crucial for all types of disputes. Procedural judicialization comes at the expense
of increased cost and lengthier procedures. The supposedly increased quality is not desirable at
all times.
Second, the court’s support or assistance in the arbitral procedure is necessary to some
degree. The court has a vital and integral role to play at the front-end (when enforcing the
arbitral agreement), while the arbitral procedure is on-going (e.g., appointing arbitrators,
hearing witnesses under oath, rendering interim orders, etc.),11 and at the back end (when
recognizing, enforcing, setting-aside, or refusing to enforce the arbitral award). Courts have
coercive powers and are therefore the institution that reassures the legitimacy and authority of
the arbitral procedure. The main advantage of ICA—the enforceability of arbitral agreements
and awards—is at the mercy of the national courts, who should exercise a pro-enforcement
8 See e.g., Michael Mustill, Comments on Fast-Track Arbitration, 10 J. INT’L ARB. 121, 122 (1993) (“The
procedure was, by definition, fast-track. That was why the parties chose it as their method of resolving disputes.
What has changed in the last forty years is the creation of the new, slow-track arbitration which is the kind of
arbitration which is the subject of almost everything written and spoken on the subject.”) and Javier Tarjuelo, Fast
Track Procedures: A New Trend in Institutional Arbitration, 11 PÉREZ-LLORCA L.J. 105, 105 (2017) (“The current
sophistication and emergence of formalism in arbitration can sometimes significantly hamper arbitral proceedings.
For this reason, the need for quick and effective awards may be taking modern arbitration back to its roots given
that, historically, decisions on disputes between merchants would typically be rendered within a very short space
of time.”).
9 Carbonneau, supra note 1, at 127.
10 For a discussion on the difficulty between balancing speed, cost, and quality, see e.g. Jennifer Kirby,
Efficiency in International Arbitration: Whose Duty Is It?, J. OF INT. ARB. 689 (2015).
11 Moreover, two negative aspects of ICA are perceived to be the “lack of effective sanctions during the arbitral
process” and the “lack of power in relation to third parties.” See White & Case and Queen Marry School of
International Arbitration, supra note 2, at 2.
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attitude; that is, an almost unconditional deference to the arbitral decision-making.12 Thus,
courts uphold the transnational arbitral legal order by not intervening unnecessarily in the
procedure. Moreover, courts are tasked with protecting mandatory law by correcting wrongs
through exercising final scrutiny. This function means that courts are the inevitable guardians
of the arbitral order by sanctioning its legitimacy and authority. Put simply: for reasons deeply
embedded in policy objectives and political concerns, courts in pro-arbitration jurisdictions
rarely interfere with the arbitral order and generally exercise a pro-enforcement approach. Thus,
court judicialization should be exercised very lightly, but it has a crucial function for protecting,
preserving, and guarding the rule of law and the arbitral legal order. When a court instead
intervenes unnecessarily in the arbitral procedure, the court judicialization can quickly turn
adverse and do more harm than good.
Finally, arbitral institutions13 have helped craft a decentralized arbitral legal order by
generating workable templates based on best practices that furthers formality, i.e., a form of
judicial norm.14 Thus, a decentralized yet formalized arbitral legal order has been developed
through arbitral institutions and other stakeholders to the transnational arbitral legal order.
As stated above, there are many positive aspects of judicialization, but there are a few
negative ones too. Primarily, the negative aspects have to do with the judicialization having
turned the arbitral procedure to become lengthy and costly. Thus, a serious gap has been
identified between commercial entities’ expectations, on the one hand, and experiences, on the
other.15 These users are now demanding a cost and speed efficient solution to the perceived and
hard-felt issues.16 In this paper I argue that expedited arbitration meets that demand.17 With the
increased use of expedited arbitration, the negative aspects of the judicialization trend seems to
be redressed, while we still preserve the added benefits of the positive aspects of judicialization

12 See e.g. José María Alonso, The Globalization of International Arbitration in THE BAKER MCKENZIE
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION YEARBOOK 11, 18-19 (2017) (explaining that transnational principle in the public
procedural order created by the arbitral legal order include impartiality, the right to be heard, and equality). See
Carbonneau, supra note 1, at 3.
13 See e.g., AAA-ICDR, SCC, ICC, IBA, UNCITRAL, etc.
14 The “formalization” has also been a source of critique. See e.g., Leon Trakman & Hugh Montgomery, The
Judicialization of International Commercial Arbitration: Pitfall or Virtue, 30 LJIL 405, 405 (2017) (“Recently,
within international commercial arbitration (ICA) circles, a growing concern has emerged amongst critics,
arbitrators, and commentators alike about the formalization and 'judicialization' of international arbitration. Critics
have suggested that ICA laws and procedures increasingly replicate national judicial procedures, national laws,
and their legal intricacies.”).
15 Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice: Taking Charge of the ‘New Litigation’, 7 DEPAUL BUS. &
COM. L. J. 400 (2009). See also Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth and Impact
of “Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843, 895 (2004) and Stipanowich, supra note 7,
at 4 and Peter Morton, Can a World Exist Where Expedited Arbitration Becomes the Default Pocedure?, 26:1
ARB. INT’L., 104 (2010) (“One questions how long this apparent mis-match between the needs and expectations
of the business community and the product that is being delivered by the arbitration community can continue.”).
16 See e.g., Morton, supra note 15, at 104 (“THERE IS a growing chorus of discontent from the 'consumers' of
the arbitration process (the business community) about the increased time and costs of arbitration.”).
17 See e.g., Michael Mcllwrath and Roland Schroeder, The View from an International Arbitration Customer: in
Dire Need of Early Resolution, 74 ARB. 3 (2008).

5

(mainly the increased procedural quality and necessary supervision of complex and high-stake
disputes).18
On this note, it is my opinion that treating expedited arbitration as the default
mechanism for certain low-value and less complex disputes would further entrench the currency
and standing ICA, in particular for small and medium enterprises (“SME”). In a word, expedited
arbitration offers a compelling alternative to the arbitral trial.19 Furthermore, given the lessons
learned during COVID-19, I would go one step further and propose that we start considering a
world where digital (i.e., remote) expedited arbitration becomes the default mechanism for
certain low-value and less complex disputes. The approval of digital expedited arbitration as
the default mechanism would help to further meet the demands of cost-reduction and increased
speed, i.e., the negative effects of judicialization.20
However, one should not forget that, ultimately, what kind of arbitral procedure that is
suitable for a particular dispute at any given time will depend on the actual need for “litigationlike” futures when the party is presenting his or her case. Wearing my academic and practical
hat simultaneously, I am constantly engaging in the almost impossible task of balancing
between cost, speed, and quality (known as the “iron triangle”) from a theoretical as well as
practical level.21 This is a daunting and cumbersome task. Whether to proceed with expedited
arbitration or the arbitral trial is one such area of dispute resolution that underscores and
illustrates the dilemma of how much quality one would (or should, or even could be due to
mandatory laws of due process) sacrifice for the advantages of speed and cost reduction. When
should a client be instructed to proceed with expedited arbitration and when is the arbitral trial
more suitable? There is no easy answer to the difficult question posed.
Notwithstanding this, by understanding fragmentation of international arbitration and
the positive and negative aspects of judicialization, we can start crafting default and
subsequently case-specific solutions that meets the demand for a cost and speed efficient
procedure for certain (not all) disputes and for certain (not all) parties.
Conclusively, in this paper I argue that expedited arbitration enters the transnational
scene as an exceptional development in the world of transnational dispute resolution.22
18 This is not to be confused with “fast-track arbitration,” which is merely an accelerated form of arbitration with
tighter scheduling and perhaps less maneuvering when it comes to requests for extension. See e.g. See generally
Mustill, supra note 8.
19 See e.g., Haflidi Kristjan Larusson, Expedited Arbitration – Meeting the Needs of SMEs, 63 SCANDINAVIAN
STUD. 169, 176 (2017) (expedited arbitration“has grown over the last few years, as it brings arbitration closer to
its historical roots of timely, cost-effective and commercially orientated dispute resolution. As complex, lengthy
and costly litigation and arbitration have become the norm, it is time to try and strike a new balance in this context
and where international arbitration serves the needs of the whole of the international business community. A
number of arbitral institutions have now separate rules governing expedited arbitration.16 This is a direct response
to the increased demand for such alternative, faster and less-costly arbitration in the international business
community and serves the needs of SMEs in particular.”).
20 This is a suggestion de lege ferenda and limited to the expedited arbitral procedure. I have elsewhere argued
that there do exist a right to a physical arbitration hearing, even though I acknowledge that digital hearings are
fully functional, and I have also had both good and bad experiences with such procedures. In fact, I am working
on a paper where I explain why arbitrators may have had the powers during the pandemic to decide to conduct a
digital hearing at the protest of one party in expedited arbitrations. → source for this statement
21 See Kirby, supra note 10.
22 To some degree it can actually be said to be new wine in old bottles. But whether it is a novel development or
a revisiting of ICA’s gravamen is too important to touch upon in brief and merits a discussion in its own. The
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Additionally, it will assist international lawyers with dispute system design (“DSD”). I am not,
however, arguing that expedited arbitration is suitable to complex and high-stake disputes. The
arbitral trial has also been a pragmatic and inevitable development. I argue that the arbitral trial
is the best dispute resolution venue for redress of high-value and complex commercial disputes
with a transborder component to it.

2. Fragmentation of International Arbitration
International law and procedures demand increased specialization and expertise. As
arbitration has grown in taste for various kinds of disputes, arbitration has been customized
with the specific subject-matter in mind and has therefore grown into something that it was not
traditionally. Fragmentation in international arbitration is seen in—or rather appears as a result
of—inter alia widened subject-matter arbitrability,23 various kinds of arbitrations having
developed to facilitate growing complexity,24 and law firms focusing on arbitration in an
increasingly niche manner.
Over time, arbitration as a dispute resolution venue was asked to handle not only
commercial disputes between commercial parties, but also financial services disputes, labor
disputes, consumer disputes, investment disputes, intellectual property disputes, antitrust
disputes, disputes implicating fraud and corruption claims, etc.25 To meet these demands at the
highest level, institutional rules had to be formed with the subject-matter complexity in mind.
The default procedure had to be formed as an arbitral trial with all the necessary litigation tools
available and set-up for an adversarial procedure to meet this new reality of arbitrating complex
and high-stake matters.
Within arbitration then, the widened subject-matter arbitrability has pushed the
procedure to embrace litigation features not necessary for all commercial matters but needed
for more complex and high-value disputes. Moreover, the increased demand (primarily as a call
from academicians) for fairness and justice lead to the need for regulating the arbitral procedure
as well as tightening the back-end court scrutiny of arbitral awards. Moreover, it has also invited

author will likely prepare an empirical, historical, and comparative research paper on this theme in the years to
come. See e.g., Mustill, supra note 8, at 122 (“The procedure was, by definition, fast-track. That was why the
parties chose it as their method of resolving disputes. What has changed in the last forty years is the creation of
the new, slow-track arbitration which is the kind of arbitration which is the subject of almost everything written
and spoken on the subject.”)
23 See e.g. Ylli Dautaj, The Act is not the entire story: How to make sense of the U.S. Arbitration Act, KLUWER
ARB. BLOG (April. 4, 2018). http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/04/04/act-not-entire-story-makesense-u-s-arbitration-act/.
24 See e.g. Meng Chen, Emerging Internal Control in Institutional Arbitration, 18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
295, 305 (2017) (“Contrary to uniform trends in arbitration rules, these arbitration institutions follow disparate
paths on establishing arbitration rules governing specific subject matters. All arbitration institutions located in
Europe choose to rely on arbitration rules and mediation rules to provide effective service, while the AAA from
the United States takes another path. The AAA enacted more than sixty arbitration rules, codes, and protocols to
govern very specific subject matters, including but not limited to consumer disputes, labor disputes, security
disputes, construction disputes, internet disputes, electronic transaction disputes, ethical issues, real estate disputes,
insurance disputes, and class arbitration issues. These regulations significantly enrich AAA's services in dispute
resolution.”).
25 For a discussion on “specialization” in ICA, see Trakman & Montgomery, supra note 14, at 428-29.
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scholars and policymakers from not purely commercial fields to “think” about (or rather level
an attack on) arbitration.
I propose that international arbitration is indeed tailored to the subject-matter and
complexity in mind, while always preserving the fundamental elements of the procedure. ICA
should be divided in two broader categories: (1) the Arbitral Trial, and (2) the Expedited
Arbitration. Within these broader categories, sub-categories can develop to meet the
specialization. I agree with Trakman and Montgomery in that:
[T]he value of ICA ought to transcend a single and determinative pathway, such
as streamlined, quick, and timely awards, or even the converse of exhaustive
case analyses, voluminous written proceedings, and meticulously reasoned
awards. The nature of arbitration should, rather, be contextually determined,
taking account of the dispute, jurisdiction, applicable law, and reasonable
expectations of the parties. In this way “best international practice” can provide
a more situational way of looking at ICA, rather than trying to promote the “onesize-fits-all” model of the 'ideal' arbitration often promoted in the narrative of
“judicialization.”26
Finally, I should add that there are both positive and negative aspects of “fragmentation”. I do
not criticize the arbitral trial, nor the utilization of American advocacy through common law
trial techniques. Quite the opposite is true. Such usage has proven instrumental to an advocate’s
success in international arbitration. However, I do offer an account for how expedited
arbitration can help remedy some of the negative aspects of fragmentation and judicialization.

3. Three Manifestations of Judicialization
Judicialization is the process by which a non-judicial alternative dispute resolution
mechanism (e.g., negotiation, mediation, and arbitration) comes to be dominated by quasijudicial (i.e., legalistic) rules and procedures.27
In the early 1900’s, ICA was used primarily by commercial parties from France,
Germany, and Switzerland, but not often so by English or US parties.28 Even as late as post
world-war II, arbitration in the United States existed in primarily two forms; that is, as a
procedure for small monetary value disputes and for labor disputes.29 United States was not—
back then—concerned with ICA nor with investment treaty arbitration (ITA).

26 Id., at 406.
27 C. Neal Tate, Why the Expansion of Judicial Power?, THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 27, 28 (C.
NEAL TATE & TORBJÖRN VALLINDER (eds.), THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 28 (1995).
28 Eric Bergsten, Americanization of International Arbitration, 18 PACE INT'L L. REV. 289, 292 (2006).
29 Id. at 290 (2006).
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Times have changed and ICA is nowadays widely used by US commercial entities and
has undergone a radical change as a result.30 More than that, following the US involvement,
ICA has allegedly become “judicialized” or “Americanized.”31 Eric Bergsten rightly noted that:
American lawyers participating in international commercial arbitration brought
and used American litigation skills. The Americans utilized a more aggressive
form of advocacy than the continental Europeans were used to in international
commercial arbitration. The European arbitrators tended to be the "Grand Old
Men" of the European legal community. While this is a broad generalization, it
is accurate. The American attorneys tended to be fact-oriented while European
attorneys tended to be law-oriented and wanted to hear more about the
appropriate legal theories relevant to the dispute.32
The European (or “Civilian”) model of arbitration was based on the active role of the
arbitrator in constituting the record and in applying the law.33 The common law model, on the
other hand, is adversarial. Thus, the “battle” between adjudicatory methodologies had to answer
questions such as: “What fact-finding techniques should apply? Who bears responsibility for
and has the final authority in fact-finding? How much discovery should take place? What
probative value should be given to variegated factual elements?”34 Carbonneau described the
Anglo-American influence, and the common law-civil law divide as follows:
The influence of the Anglo-American legal profession extended to the structure
of arbitral proceedings, which began to mirror the basic characteristics of a

30 The push for ICA was initiated in the 1960s and 1970s by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and
the adoption of commercial arbitration rules. See Supplementary Procedures for International Commercial
Arbitration of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) (February 1, 1986). The percentage of cases solved
through federal civil cases decreased between 1962 and 2002. See Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 4.
31 See Roger P. Alford, The American Influence on International Arbitration, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 69
(2003) (in this article, Professor Alford presents several American influences, including but not limited to the
influence of Anglo-American law firms, the style of advocacy, discovery, choice of law, language, and venue);
Elena V. Helmer, International Commercial Arbitration: Americanized, “Civilized,” or Harmonized?, 19(2) OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 35, 35 (2003); Steven Seidenberg, International Arbitration Loses Its Grip: Are U.S.
Lawyers to Blame?, 96 A.B.A. J. 50 (2010). For a brief explanation of what “Americanization” is, see e.g. George
M. von Mehrem & Alana C. Jochum, Is International Arbitration Becoming Too American?, 2 GLOBAL BUS. L.
REV. 47, 49 (2011) (“What, then, is ‘Americanization’? I see it as the role played by American (or, more accurately,
Anglo-American) procedural tools in international arbitration—and the style used by advocates in those
proceedings.”).
32 Bergsten, supra note 28, at 294. See also Helmer, supra note 31, at 36 (“The result of judicialization in
arbitration is ‘formalism, judicial style, and diminished flexibility,’ and eventually, transformation of arbitration
into ‘offshore-U.S.-style-litigation.’.”); Mehrem & Jochum, supra note 31, at 47 (“American lawyers naturally
brought with them a desire to use American trial procedures. They wanted to use cross-examination to confront
adverse witnesses. They also wanted document production to develop evidence to support their case. American
clients and arbitrators were of the same mind. After all, from the perspective of those accustomed to American
litigation, document production and cross-examination were critical procedural tools.”).
33 CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 153.
34 Id. at 166.
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United States common law trial. In effect, the coexistence of two influential
centers of legal doctrine on arbitration instituted a struggle between the
European civil law and the Anglo-American common law for dominance in the
conduct of arbitral proceedings. This tension continues to be present in
contemporary arbitral practice.35
This “judicialization” or “Americanization”, then, seeks the surrendering of certain key features
of arbitration—such as cost-reduction and speedy outcomes—in favor of increased
predictability, reliability, and equity.36 The American participation can be said to have moved
the traditional continental European informality and simplicity of arbitral proceedings to a more
formal litigation-kind venue “that includes expert opinions and witnesses, cross-examination,
extensive discovery, lengthy interrogatories and depositions, and all of the other ingredients of
the American-style adversarial trial.”37 Put differently, the influence of the common law trial
techniques allegedly improves the quality of the ICA procedure, but at the expense of costs and
speed. The question is now whether such trade-off is always meritorious.
I wish to highlight two sides of the “judicialization” story, namely, that there are both
positive and negative aspects of such development. The often-one-sided narrative of describing
“judicialization” as inherently negative undercuts the broadening potential of ICA to “not only
be quick, cheap, and efficient, but also internationally accessible, carefully reasoned, respected,
and supported by all the parties involved.”38
My task here is limited to offer an account for how expedited arbitration can help remedy
some of the negative aspects of judicialization, while not trying, or even intending, to argue
against the positive aspects of what I call the arbitral trial in this paper.
a. The Arbitral Procedure
Much of the criticism of judicialization in ICA “stems from standard arbitration
procedures [having] taken on the trappings of litigation”; that is, US-style litigation and with it
“extensive discovery and motion practice, highly contentious advocacy, long cycle time and
high cost.”39 Within high contentious advocacy I would say that the two most prevalent features
would be American style of document submission and examination of witnesses and expert
witnesses.40
35 Id. at 13.
36 Helmer, supra note 31, at 36.
37 CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 137.
38 Trakman & Montgomery, supra note 14, at 407.
39 Stipanowich, supra note 15, at 384. On the continental reception of discovery, see Helmer, supra note 31, at
50 (“When it comes to the Continent, ‘the word “discovery” rank[s] second only to “punitive damages” in terms
of its capacity to strike terror into the civil law hearts,’ as noticed by a couple of insightful practitioners. Continental
lawyers are accustomed to a different kind of ‘discovery’ (or rather ‘disclosure’): lawyers for each side produce
all relevant documents to support their claim or defense, and the judge (or an arbitrator) may question witnesses,
appoint experts, and, in a number of countries, also order a party to produce relevant evidence.”).
40 See e.g., Irene Welser & Christian Klausegger, Fast Track Arbitration: Just Fast or Something Different in
AUSTRIAN YEARBOOK ON INT’L ARB. 259, 260 (2009) (“Nowadays, parties tend to submit extensive files and
voluminous attachments to the arbitrators far in excess of the amount of material they would produce in state court.
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It is true that the American litigation style and techniques have pushed ICA in a certain
“more American” path. However, this may be a natural outcome of US participation. It would
be strange if the opposite was true, i.e., that the continental way of doing arbitration, which in
turn mimics more the continental civil law tradition, would have remained the dominant
influence on ICA as it was prior to the US participation.41 Moreover, it is also true that not all
aspects of US litigation have grown into integral parts of ICA, e.g. interrogatories and
depositions are rarely used.42 In an interesting manner, Eric Bergsten explained the American
entrance to ICA through an analogy with immigration, he wrote that:
The international commercial arbitration experience during the last fifty years is
analogous to the experience of immigration into a country. Immigrants must
adjust to their new country, but the country will also change to accommodate
them. This is what happened to international commercial arbitration when the
Americans arrived, and things have been evolving ever since.43
Furthermore, I believe that much of the reasons behind procedural judicialization of ICA has
been a result of the widening in subject-matter arbitrability.44 It is inevitably the case that in
order to “grapple more effectively with a range of business disputes, including many large,
complex cases, arbitration procedures” became longer and more detailed.45 Put simply,
adversarial lawyers had to utilize trial techniques to get ahead and ultimately to win. Factfinding through discovery, advocacy through cross-examination, and extensive hearings to
present one’s case with full due process are important features of litigation and should be
maintained for certain high-stake ICA matters.
I shall also add that the “Common Law-Civil Law Divide” is exaggerated.46 From a
comparative law perspective, I would say that it has been advantageous to adapt US litigation
advocacy. The utility of American trial techniques is here to stay, but an alternative to the
arbitral trial should be provided for.

Because arbitrators, unlike state judges, have a reputation to lose, and because compensation schemes for
arbitrators tend to foster a more thorough approach, arbitral tribunals are nowadays often expected to review
lengthy submissions and countless binders of attachments, despite the fact that, in most circumstances, the case
could have been presented in a shorter and more precise manner without sacrificing quality.”).
41 See e.g., Mehrem & Jochum, supra note 31, at 55 (“We cannot expect American parties—advised by American
lawyers—to agree to participate in a process that is bereft of all American procedural mechanisms.”).
42 See id. at 54.
43 Bergsten, supra note 28, at 301.
44 See Dautaj, supra note 23.
45 Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 11.
46 See e.g. Siegfried H. Elsing & John M. Townsend, Bridging the Common Law-Civil Law Divide in International
Arbitration, 18 ARB. INT'L 59 (2002); but see (or contra) CARBONNEAU, supra note 2, at 153 (“Old debates about
common law and civil law concepts of procedure have been revitalized.”).
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Another fact that pushed “judicialization” in ICA is that the number of US businesses
participating in ICA increased, and so did the participation and involvement by US law firms.47
This is the essence of a market-economic development.48 Elena Helmer eloquently wrote that:
The author believes that American influence on international arbitration is
significant but falls short of Americanization. Rather, the current trends and
developments in international commercial arbitration demonstrate an ongoing
process of harmonization in many areas of international arbitration. This
includes national arbitration laws, rules of major arbitration institutions, and
arbitration practices, as demonstrated by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and International Bar Association (lBA)
documents as well as procedures adopted by international arbitral tribunals.49
Finally, it should be mentioned that the critique of ICA in terms of becoming “judicialized” or
“Americanized” has not been a critique of the procedure lacking quality, but rather one on
increased cost and lack of efficiency.50 Thus, not all aspects of the “judicialization” are
inherently negative. That said, reforms to accommodate the legitimate expectations vis-á-vis
streamlining the arbitral procedures has been presented with the intent of the expedited
arbitration regime.
b. National Courts
National courts can assist, support, or interfere with the arbitral procedure at the frontend, i.e., where one of the parties, for example, seek to attack the validity of the arbitration
agreement or challenge the arbitrability, while the other seek to compel arbitration. National
courts can also support or unnecessarily interfere with the arbitral procedure at the back end,
i.e. when the award is challenged or the enforcement is refused. The arbitral legal order has
partly been de-judicialized, or “a-nationalized” (depending on how one looks at it51), by having
elaborated uniform and harmonized arbitration laws and multilateral enforcement treaties that
makes foreign arbitral awards final, binding, and directly enforceable, subject to a few (mostly

47 Alford, supra note 31, at 80 (“Just as the United States has been and will be the dominant force in economic
globalization, our law firms will be the dominant force in international arbitration.”).
48 See id. (“Just as the United States has been and will be the dominant force in economic globalization, our law
firms will be the dominant force in international arbitration.”).
49 Helmer, supra note 31, at 37-38.
50 For a good discussion of efficiency in document production, with an emphasis on the burden of proof rather
than discovery, see Yves Derains, Towards Greater Efficiency in Document Production before Arbitral
Tribunals—A Continental Viewpoint, ICC INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN, ¶ 11 (Spec.
Supplement 2006).
51 The formalization of ICA by putting it in a regime of its own could be a manifestation of judicialization, while
also be considered a de-judicialized aspects of the procedure since it removes court interference, i.e. what I present
to be the second manifestation of judicialization.
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procedural) limitations.52 Moreover, national courts’ submission through deference to the
enforceability of the arbitral agreement and the arbitral decision-making has been almost
constant in pro-arbitration jurisdictions and remains instrumental for the institution of ICA.53
Thus, court judicialization through interference, as opposed to assistance and support, in the
arbitral legal order should be exercised with a great measure of caution.
I, furthermore, argue that a great part of the reason for the judicialization of ICA in terms
of back-end scrutiny (e.g. the “second-look doctrine”) has been a result of the widening in
subject-matter arbitrability.54 Moreover, one must recognize the fact that the quality check by
national courts (albeit limited) reassures the legitimacy and authority of the arbitral legal
order—i.e. some judicialization is inevitable and necessary.55 I do not take a strong position,
yet, on whether a completely detached and autonomous arbitral order with respect to the backend would be a good or bad development.56

c. Arbitral Institutions and IBA
Arbitration has matured to have its own institutional personality and status; rules on
arbitral procedure have an established content and arbitral institutions provide the necessary

52 See e.g. UNCITRAL* Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 50a-100
(LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through P.A. 21-6); Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 84 Stat. 692, 330 UNTS 3, 21 U.S.T. 2517 (“New York Convention”); Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)) 575 UNTS 159; Alonso, supra note 12, at 12 (explaining that the
UNCITRAL Model Law and the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(1958) have primarily contributed to the expansion and generalization of arbitration) and CARBONNEAU, supra
note 2, at 10 (“[d]uring the 1990s, there was an eruption of UNCITRAL-inspired arbitration laws throughout the
globe”).
53 See CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 53 (“Under contemporary rule-making in the area, two interrelated
principles provide a type of solution: (1) highly limited judicial supervision of awards; and (2) giving absolute
sovereign effect to arbitrator rulings. The two rules constitute two sides of one coin: judicial deference to and the
hegemony of the arbitration process.”).
54 See Dautaj, supra note 23. See also Tibor Várady et al, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION – A
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 65-66 (AMERICAN CASEBOOK SERIES, 7th ed. 2018) (“As, however, arbitration
became the dominant method of settlement of international trade disputes, the spectrum of cases submitted to
arbitration became much more broad. It now includes most difficult and complicated cases as well; it includes
acrimonious confrontations, and disputes about huge sums of money. The newly emerging environment prompted
some transformation. Informality has ceded ground to regulation, spontaneity has found a rival in
conceptualization. Informality is still on the banner of arbitration, it is still one of its actual comparative
advantages, but proportions have shifted.”).
55 See e.g. MICHAEL W. REISMAN, SYSTEM OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION
BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 127-28, 140 (Duke University Press 1992); CARBONNEAU, supra note 2, at 4-5 (“ICA
needed the approbation of states to benefit from municipal court’s status of legitimacy and their authority in order
to function effectively as a transborder system.”); cf CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 85 (“Because arbitral tribunals
have become a substitute vehicle for law, the critics argue that courts must preserve some basic role and guarantee
that the tribunals follow ritualistic patterns and are guided by agreed-upon legal rules.”).
56 See e.g., JEAN-FRANCOIS POUDRET & SEBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 120-34 (Sweet & Maxwell 2007).
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infrastructure for the proceedings.57 Arbitral institutions supplement the vacuum of controls on
ICA and improves the regime’s legitimacy, authority reliability, and effectiveness. 58 Moving
ICA to a decentralized transnational legal order through institutional service providers is a
welcomed development. However, such development inevitably demands legalistic rules and
procedures.
Both institutional rules and the soft laws developed by, for example, the International
Bar Association (IBA) establishes formal arbitral authority. These rules are agreed upon and
therefore also an expression of party autonomy. As was rightly observed by Cheng:
Except for judicial review, arbitration institutions also play important roles in
controlling international arbitration process. Arbitration rules and regulations
established by numerous arbitration institutions take on major responsibility to
regulate arbitration process in the modern age. Because arbitration institutions
are at the leading positions that can make sensitive and timely responses to their
clients' needs and have sophisticated legislative experience, institutional
arbitration rules and regulations are tailored as practice-oriented and have
effective enforcement. In addition, arbitration institutions can interpret and
execute their own arbitration rules in a more consistent and certain manner.
Furthermore, defects discovered in arbitration rules are easier and faster to get
revised or repaired in practice.59
I perceive much of the institutional arbitration development to be a positive manifestation of
judicialization. It is a form of harmonization of the arbitral legal order, which has been
accomplished inter alia through arbitral institutional rules, UNCITRAL arbitration rules, the
IBA rules (e.g., on evidence and ethics).60
Notwithstanding this, arbitral institutions, too, have realized that the development may
have gone too far and therefore sought alternative procedures for achieving a speedy and costeffective procedure. Arbitral institutions must ask themselves what more they can do “to bring
to the attention of counsel and the parties the possibilities of adopting an expedited process.”61
The introduction of expedited arbitration is a step in the right direction. Making expedited
arbitration the default procedure for low-value and less complex matters is another step in the
right direction. Chen observed that:
Generally, arbitration institutions do have different emphases in revising their
arbitration rules, but the major direction of their revisions is streamlining
arbitration proceedings by granting arbitral tribunals more discretionary power
and providing faster and simpler procedural options. Maybe it is still too early
to contend that similar revisions in institutional arbitration rules evidence that
57 See CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 71.
58 See Chen, supra note 24, at 310.
59 Id. at 308.
60 See e.g., Helmer, supra note 31, at 55-63.
61 Morton, supra note 15, at 111.
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international arbitration culture or standard norms have been formed. At least, it
is clear that, institutional arbitration rules all over the world comply more and
more with a uniform trend by taking similar revisionary paths.62
Finally, I believe that the US influence in ICA is also a result of American expertise in
leading through institutional soft powers. It has rightly been noted that the US “influence has
been ameliorated by countervailing forces, producing efforts at harmonization such as the IBA
Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration.”63

4. Expedited Arbitration
Arbitration is the overwhelmingly preferred international commercial dispute
settlement regime. Thus, this paper actually engages in a discussion and analysis on the
perfection of a dispute resolution system that works—and the proof is in the pudding.64
Expedited arbitration is a way in which to offer a variant of arbitration that brings the
regime back to its roots and ones more elevates the currency of speed and cost efficiency, while
simultaneously understanding the need of the heightened standing of additional procedural
“quality” in some complex and high-stake cases. Put simply, expedited arbitration constitutes
an important tool to counter the negative effect of judicialization—i.e., to save ICA from
becoming as costly and lengthy as litigation while not undercutting the option of pursuing the
arbitral trial.65
Thus, expedited arbitration is an alternative approach to both litigation and to the arbitral
trial. It is “designed for parties who consider time to be of the essence, and who are willing to
accept the marginal reduction in legal security for greater speed and lower costs.”66 One can
say that expedited arbitration aligns ICA with the values that long guided the procedure in
continental Europe, instead of being “placed at the mercy of vicissitudes of adversarial
advocacy.”67
In 2010, Peter Morton asked whether a “world can exist where expedited arbitration
becomes the default procedure”?68 This question was asked at the backdrop of the
62 Chen, supra note 24, at 305. She also concluded that “Empirical research on data collected from eight worldleading arbitration institutions indicates that: first, these arbitration institutions are constantly revising and
enriching their arbitration rules to improve dispute resolution services; second, institutional arbitration rules are
revised to a more uniform way at the worldwide level; third, arbitration institutions take different paths in
establishing arbitration rules and regulations for specific subject matters.” Id. at. 309.
63 Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 23.
64 White & Case and Queen Marry School of International Arbitration, supra note 3, at 2; see also Christopher R.
Drahozal, New Experiences of International Arbitration in the United States, 54 THE AM. J. OF COMP. L., 233, 255
(2006) (“As the globalization of national economies continues, more par ties will turn to private rather than public
means of resolving transnational disputes.”).
65 See e.g,. Giacomo Marchisio, Recent Solutions to Old Problems, A Look at the Expedited Procedure under the
Revised ICC rules of Arbitration, ICC DISPUTE RESOLUTION BULLETIN, 76, 80 (2017).
66 Paulsson, supra note 7, at 715.
67 CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 146.
68 Morton, supra note 15.
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dissatisfaction with the evolution of ICA turning into a judicialized dispute resolution venue.
As of today, expedited arbitration has become the default procedure at certain arbitral
institutions. For example, the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) automatically
directs certain arbitration matters into the expedited route, i.e., per default.69
Thus, “[p]lanners and drafters of commercial dispute resolution agreements must move
beyond a monolithic conception of arbitration and consider process options in light of
contextual needs and goals.”70 This trend towards revisiting the fundamental elements of ICA
started in the twenty-first century whereby leading US arbitral institutions created templates for
expedited or streamlined arbitration.71
a. What is Expedited Arbitration?
Expedited arbitration is a procedure that holds the traditional advantages of arbitration,
i.e., the procedure is (a) flexible; (b) confidential; and (c) final, binding, and directly
enforceable.72 In addition, the procedure is, as it once was, (d) quick, and (e) cost-effective.
These last two element came as a response to the criticism of international arbitration having
become costly, lengthy, and complex.73
Thus, the underlying intention behind expedited arbitration is to pre-define a cost- and
speed effective procedure that is proportional to the value or complexity of the dispute.74 In a
word: expedited arbitration is an attempt to redress the judicialization of ICA by offering a costand speed efficient venue for redress of commercial grievances with reasonable due process.
Mostly, this venue is offered for small value claims and for small and medium enterprises.
b. When is Expedited Arbitration Practical and When is it Not?
Expedited arbitration is practical when the clients’ goals and priorities are met by a less
judicial procedure for dispute resolution. If costs and time can be reduced, while the conflict
management aspect can be facilitated efficiently, the expeditious format is apt for the task at

69 The ICC makes expedited arbitration applicable by default to a dispute that does not exceed USD 2 Million.
The parties can of course “opt-out”. See Int’l Chamber of Commerce, Expedited Procedure Provisions,
ICCWBO.ORG, https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/arbitration/expedited-procedure-provisions/ (last
visited 18 September 2021).
70 Id. at 57.
71 Stipanowich, supra note 15, at 391.
72 See e.g., https://sccinstitute.com/our-services/expedited-arbitration/.
73 See Piotr Wójtowicz and Franco Gevaerd, How Uncitral’s Working Group II on Arbitration Is Analyzing the
Field to Help Expedited Processes, 37(6) INTERNATIONAL ADR 90 (2019). For a good discussion on the
“judicialization” of arbitration (in the negative and positive, respectively), see Stipanowich, supra note 8 and ALEC
STONE SWEET AND FLORIAN GRISEL, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: JUDICIALIZATION,
GOVERNANCE, LEGITIMACY (2017).
74 Marchisio, supra note 65, at 77 (“These reforms were inspired by the so-called principle of proportionality,
according to which the procedural means invested in a dispute should be proportional to the value of the dispute
itself.”).
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hand. The court-like due process is not the name of the game, even though some due process
represent a mandatory rule that cannot be infringed—even as an expression of party autonomy.
Expedited arbitration is not suitable for complex matters or mattes with a high value in
dispute.75 Moreover, expedited arbitration is likely not suitable for multi-party disputes.76 There
can often be a tension between time and economy, on one hand, and other goals, on the other.77
The rules of expedited arbitration “were intended to satisfy the demand for a simplified and
more cost-effective means of arbitration in cases of less complexity and monetary value.”78
Some guidance for when expedited arbitration rules are not practical can be found in the
recent UNCITRAL Working Group II’s “Draft provision 3” on “Non-application of the
Expedited Arbitration Provisions”.79 Such a solution can be crafted by counsel in arbitration
clauses, too, for example as follows:

75 It is important to point out here that value is not the single decider of complexity. Complex cases can have a
low value, or no determined value (e.g. when a claim for specific performance of declaratory statement has been
put forth). See e.g., Tymczyszyn, supra note 7, at 27 (“Further, the value of the claim often may not reflect the
complexity of the issues in dispute.”).
76 Id. at 27 (“[g]enerally, fast track arbitration will not be suitable for complex disputes or multi-party
proceedings”).
77 Stipanowich, supra note 15, at 406 (“Accommodating these competing expectations ion discrete cases is
perhaps the greatest challenge for drafters of arbitration and dispute resolution provisions, since the balance will
be struck differently depending on the circumstances.”); see also Ylli Dautaj and Per Magnusson, An SCC
Perspective: What Happens When the Expedited Arbitration Provisions no Longer Remain Practical?, 3 JURIDISK
TIDSKRIFT (2021) and Tymczyszyn, supra note 7, at 27 (“Expedited procedures would best suit those cases where
the need to resolve disputes quickly outweighs the parties’ need to present their case in scrupulous
detail, and there are no major factual disagreements. If determination of the factual issues requires an expert’s
involvement or detailed witness statements, then fast track is best avoided.”).
78 ROBIN OLDENSTAM, KRISTOFFER LÖF, ALEXANDER FOERSTER ET AL, MANNHEIMER SWARTLING’S CONCISE
GUIDE TO ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN 66-67 (2019).
79
UNITED
NATIONS
GEN.
COMMISSION
ON
INT’L
TRADE
LAW
(2020),
https://undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.214. See Draft Provision 3: Draft provision 3 (Non-application of the
Expedited Arbitration Provisions)
Agreement of the parties on non-application
1. At any time during the proceedings, the parties may agree that the Expedited Arbitration Provisions shall no
longer apply to the arbitration.
Request by a party for non-application
2. At the request of a party, the arbitral tribunal may, in exceptional circumstances, determine that the Expedited
Arbitration Provisions shall no longer apply to the arbitration.
Elements to be taken into account when making the determination
3. In making the determination pursuant to paragraph 2, the arbitral tribunal shall invite the parties to express their
views and take into account, among others, the following:
(a) The urgency and time-sensitivity of resolving the dispute;
(b) At which stage of the proceedings the request is made;
(c) The legal and factual complexity of the dispute, for example, the anticipated volume of documentary evidence
and the number of witnesses;
(d) The anticipated amount in dispute (the sum of claims made in the notice of arbitration, any counterclaim made
in the response thereto as well as any amendment or supplement) and its proportionality to the expected cost of
arbitration;
(e) The terms of the parties’ agreement referring their dispute to arbitration under the Expedited Arbitration
Provisions and whether the exceptional circumstance could have been foreseeable at the time of agreement; and
(f) The consequences of the determination on the proceedings, including on the procedural fairness.
Consequences of the non-application
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The Rules for Expedited Arbitration shall apply to any dispute, controversy, or
claim arising out of or in connection with this agreement, or the breach termination
or invalidity hereof, unless the ICC or the Sole Arbitrator in its discretion
determines, taking into account the complexity of the case, the amount in dispute,
and other such circumstances, that the ordinary Arbitration Rules shall apply. If so,
the ICC shall also decide whether the Tribunal shall be composed of a Sole
Arbitrator or three Arbitrators. The seat of arbitration shall be Paris, France. The
language shall be English.
Moreover, arbitration institutions can—and do—take this into account. For example, the
ICC holds that the court can determine “that it is inappropriate in the circumstances to apply
the expedited procedure provisions.”80
Put in a word: in some cases, witnesses must be heard and cross-examined, discovery
may be crucial, and depositions really important. In these cases, especially given the width of
subject-matter arbitrability, the dispute is simply too complex for a sole arbitrator to hear within
a limited timeframe. If a matter is not practical for expedited arbitration, the institution or sole
arbitrator should decide to apply the ordinary rules instead.81
c. Why to Draft Expedited Arbitration Clauses?
The judicialized ICA came to present serious obstacles for many years to come. By
illustration, in 2004, a corporate general counsel explained that “arbitration is as expensive [as
litigation] […] less predictable, and not appealable. Arbitration is often unsatisfactory because
litigators […] run it exactly like a piece of litigation.”82 Here it should be remembered that
arbitration is the parties’ procedure and that they—together with in-house counsel—should not
allow litigators to completely dictate the format, content, and scope of the arbitral procedure.83
To some extent, litigation lawyers have already turned arbitration into an arbitral trial, but the
expedited arbitration procedure presents a response to such development and offers a
compelling alternative that is cost and speed efficient.

4. When the Expedited Arbitration Provisions no longer apply to the arbitration pursuant to paragraph 1 or 2, the
arbitral tribunal shall remain in place to the extent possible and conduct the arbitration in accordance with the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
80 Article 30(3)(c), 2017 ICC Rules.
81 See Dautaj and Magnusson, supra note 77.
82 See Stipanowich, supra note 15, at 895; Stipanowich, supra note 8, at 9.
83 See e.g., Larusson, supra note 19, at 176 (“This means that when advising SMEs, counsel should usually advise
against the use of traditional, full-scale, institutional arbitration. They know that their client will most likely not
be able to initiate such arbitral proceedings against the other party and if the other party sues the SME in such
arbitration, the costs of defending the rights of the SME will be disproportionate, possibly beyond the SME’s
financial means and could even lead to the SME’s collapse. […] For fast-moving SMEs with limited financial
flexibility, being embroiled in lengthy and costly arbitration proceedings may cause a material set-back in the
SME’s overall operations. This is especially true if the SME is still a “one-product” company with one core asset
(such as a single software solution), which may be the subject-matter of the dispute.”).
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The time to return to the fundamental elements of ICA has come, at least for many
commercial disputes. Commercial parties that appreciate the currency of speed and cost
efficiency demand a procedure that is more apt to their actual needs. In this light, both counsel
and service providers (arbitral institutions) are waking-up to their task. Stipanowich wrote that:
Clients and counsel tend to have neither the time nor the expertise to craft their
own process templates, and usually need straightforward, dependable guidance
from those that develop and administer the procedures upon which they rely.
Provider institutions are awakening to the need to promote real choices in
arbitration, but much remains to be done.84
Stipanowich then listed six reasons why business expectations do not resonate well with
the actual experience of arbitration; that is, (1) failure to plan with specific business goals in
mind; (2) difficulty of designing an appropriate system prospectively, before disputes arise; (3)
inexperience of transaction counsel when negotiating and crafting contracts with dispute
resolution clauses; (4) realities of the negotiating process with parties’ different goals and
priorities; (5) limited guidance; and (6) .85 This is exactly why counsel should become aware of
expedited arbitration when drafting dispute resolution clauses and why arbitral institutions
nowadays offers this procedure and some even treats it as the default procedure. Moreover,
courts should not too easily set-aside or refuse enforcement of expedited awards in order to
reinforce its authority and legitimacy.
The truth is this: without an alternative to the time-consuming and costly arbitration trial
that is nowadays the norm, the procedure will slowly diminish into the hands of other alternative
dispute settlement regimes—e.g., mediation, fact-finding, “rent-a-judge”, etc.86 Such systems
are not as effective and will therefore not be as effective as ICA in facilitating commerce, trade,
and investments in the same manner as ICA. The reason for civil bench trials and civil jury
trials reducing was–according to Trial Lawyers–due to formality, on the one hand, and expense
and delay, on the other.87 The same evolution is now appearing as true for ICA because it has
to a great extent mimicked and become a “new litigation.” Notwithstanding this, arbitration still
holds the fundamental element of flexibility and party autonomy which makes it possible to
amend the procedure to reflect the needs of the business community, without undercutting
reasonable due process.
d. SMEs: The Engine of Economic Prosperity and Their Adjudicatory Needs

84 Stipanowich, supra note 15, at 386.
85 Id. at 388.
86 See CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 15 (“Tinkering with the tried and true, a workable and working process, is
a hazardous undertaking.”).
87 See Stipanowich, supra note 15, at 387. Institution for the Advancement of the American Legal System, Final
Report on the Joint Project of the American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery and the Institute
for the Advancement of the American Legal System at 3 (2009).
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It has been said that the “corporate retreat from litigation was fueled by concerns about
cost.” Traditional, full-scale arbitration (i.e., the arbitral trial) is in some cases “simply too
expensive to pass the optimal cost-benefit test, in particular for small and medium-sized
enterprises” (SMEs).89 For SMEs, such a full-scale procedure decreases liquidity and deflects
focus from growth initiatives. Notwithstanding this, costs are relative and, in some cases,
justified.
Elaborating a sensible dispute resolution venue for SMEs is not a minor issue. This is a
task to take very seriously. SMEs contribute to the economic output in both US and EU of
around 50 % and enter cross-border contracts daily.90 The world is a globalized place and not
only multinational enterprises enter into commercial agreements across borders and not all
commercial transactions are valued in the millions or billions. “Therefore, it is of particular
importance that SMEs can have access to timely and cost-effective arbitration options in the
context of their cross-border contracts.”91
In Stipanowhich list of reasons why business expectations do not resonate with
experience (see above), he lists inter alia difficulties of designing an appropriate system
prospectively, inexperience of transactional counsel, and limited guidance. 92 As he further
rightly noted, “[u]nless a client is entering into a significant commercial relationship or
preparing a contract template that will be used multiple times, it is unrealistic to expect counsel
to spend considerable time planning and drafting arbitration agreements.”93 Thus, it is important
that expedited arbitration rules are increasingly being treated as the default rules. Such default
procedure will be particularly beneficial for SMEs.
88

5. Covid-19 and the Lessons Learnt: New Wine in Old Bottles
Some 10 years has passed since Peter Morton asked whether a “world can exist where
expedited arbitration becomes the default procedure”?94 When Morton asked this question, ICA
had since some time back become costly, time-consuming, and too formal—an antithesis to its
fundamental elements of flexibility, expeditiousness, and cost-efficiency. As a result,
commercial parties instead started embarking on other types of alternative dispute resolution

88 Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 24.
89 Larusson, supra note 19, at 170 -72 (“Although no companies wish to be embroiled in lengthy and costly
disputes, SMEs are particularly sensitive to contentious matters, as they are usually faced with the double Achilles’
heel of limited resources and a limited scope for acceptable delays in the development of their technology and
business. This means that SMEs’ competitive advantage can be materially hampered if they get caught in costly
dispute resolution and, in some instances, this can prove fatal to their operations.”).
90 Id. at 171 (referring to Edinburgh Group, Growing the global economy through SMEs, Issue 7 and Small
Business and Entrepreneurship Council, “www.sbecouncil.org”).
91 Id.
92 Stipanowich, supra note 15, at 388-90.
93 Id. at 390.
94 Morton, supra note 15.
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(ADR).95 This negative development was redressed by the invent of expedited arbitration. The
idea of expedited arbitration was so well received that it started finding its place as the default
arbitral procedure (see more below).
Moreover, considering the lessons learned while arbitrating during the covid-19
landscape, I know ask: Can a world exist where digital expedited arbitration becomes the
default procedure? The answer should equally be “yes it can”, and perhaps even that “it should.”
The framework for arbitration “should be tailored to reflect the very different realities of
different transactional settings.”96 It is suggested that “as the process grows and develops, its
gravamen should be revisited.”97 Digital expedited arbitration could effectively meet the
demands and expectations for commercial parties adjudicating low-value and less complex
disputes.
a. The Default Expedited Procedure
ICA in its current form has rightly been criticized for sometimes being too costly,
lengthy, and complex.98 The truth of the matter is that the arbitral trial may simply be inefficient
for certain disputes and for certain parties. These parties are now demanding a viable
alternative, but meanwhile one that preserves the fundamental elements of ICA. The good news
is that the international arbitration community has been observant and already implemented
countermeasures, including the drafting of expedited arbitration rules.99 Thanks to
specialization and judicialization of ICA, the procedure is now seriously opening up its doors
for offering a compelling alternative to the arbitral trial, i.e., the expedited arbitration route.
Expedited arbitration has been—and must continue to be—welcomed as something that
increases the versatility of institutional arbitration.100
Expedited arbitration has grown tremendously in popularity and has even become the
default procedure at certain arbitral institutions for “low value” and less complex disputes.
95 Stipanowich, supra note 7, at 7.
96 Id. at 57.
97 CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 43.
98 Wójtowicz and Gevaerd, supra note 73, at 90 (pt. 1).
99 Id.; Morton, supra note 15, at 104 (“The reputation of arbitration as the quick and informal alternative to court
proceedings is, for many, now consigned to history. Complaints are rife of the increased 'judicialisation' of
arbitration, whereby counsel and arbitrators (who may be former judges) are all too ready to import the court
procedures which they know and love into the arbitration process, with little more than a moment's thought as to
whether there may be a quicker and cheaper means of concluding that particular dispute. Practitioners and
institutions are, quite rightly, looking to tackle the problem head on.”). In this light, I also want to address the
difference between an arbitration specialist (e.g., a practicing academic) and a pure practitioner. The latter may be
less receptive to assume guilt of the arbitral procedure for not meeting traditionally perceived expectations of ICA.
The practitioners’ task and mission are to win. See e.g., Paulsson, supra note 7, at 713 (“Put on the defensive and
consumed by guilt, arbitration specialists have quickly addressed such charges and have devised solutions to the
alleged problems. The arbitration practitioners, however, have typically ignored the suggested solutions.”). The
arbitration specialists have responded to the guilt by presenting expedited arbitration rules, which will help build
an adjudicatory civilization through ICA. See e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, Building the Civilization of Arbitration
– Introduction, 113(4) PENN ST. L. R. 983 (2009).
100 Tarjuelo, supra note 8, at 116.
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Thus, expedited arbitration can nowadays be found either as an (1) automatic offering (i.e., the
default procedure), or as an (2) elective choice (i.e. in an arbitration clause or in a submissions
clause).101
Because parties generally tend to be less agreeable in limiting the arbitral width when
negotiating and even less agreeable when the dispute has ensued, there is a need for tackling
this problem through institutions adopting special rules for expedited procedures, on the one
hand, and even go as far as to make the rules applicable per default under certain circumstances.
ICC is one of the leading institutions that have made expedited arbitration the default procedure
for certain type of disputes.
The ICC rules from 2017 were, among other things, aimed at enhancing the time and
cost efficiency of the arbitral procedure. The ICC made the rules for expedited arbitration the
default ones for disputes of amounts less than USD 2 million.102 Thus, unless the parties
expressly opt-out from the expedited rules, any request for arbitration based on an arbitration
clause that refers to ICC arbitration and that was signed post March 2017 is to be arbitrated as
an expedited arbitration provided it meets the amount threshold. Furthermore, the expedited
rules provide for a six-month timeframe for rendering the award following the date of the case
management conference, with a possible extension at the discretion of the court.103 On 1 January
2021 the ICC updated its rules again, introducing significant developments (see one such
development below).
b. A Default Digital Expedited Procedure?
Whether arbitrators have the discretion to proceed with a digital hearing despite the
protest of one or both parties have been vividly discussed recently.104 My position is that
arbitrators do not have such discretion, but I unfortunately seem to hold a minority view.
However, I am of the opinion that arbitrators have such discretion in expedited arbitration (as
opposed to “ordinary” arbitration) if the procedure can otherwise be delayed by preparing for a
physical hearing. I am also of the firmly entrenched view that when one deals with expedited
arbitration, one has specifically bargained for expeditiousness at the expense of some
qualitative features.
Regardless of that discretionary debate, though, arbitral institutions are increasingly
incorporating rules that specifically empowers arbitrators to decide whether to conduct the

101 Id. at 108.
102 Parties are free to agree to the use of expedited arbitration also for disputes above the threshold amount. I,
however, would carefully consider such suggestion since the ICC may at its own discretion determine that the
procedure is not suitable for expedited arbitration, and moreover that the complexity of the case can give rise to a
challenge on the lack of due process.
103 Int’l Chamber of Com. Arbitration Rules, Art. 31(1), app. VI, Art. 1(4) (2021).
104 Ylli Dautaj and Per Magnusson, Does a Right to a Physical Hearing Exist in Arbitration? Sweden in DOES A
RIGHT TO A PHYSICAL HEARING EXIST IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION? (James Hosking, Yasmine Lahlou, and
Giacomo Rojas Elgueta eds., forthcoming in 2021). Cf James Hosking, Yasmine Lahlou, and Marcel Engholm
Cardoso, Does a Right to a Physical Hearing Exist in Arbitration? USA in DOES A RIGHT TO A PHYSICAL HEARING
EXIST IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION? (James Hosking, Yasmine Lahlou, and Giacomo Rojas Elgueta eds.,
forthcoming in 2021).
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hearing digitally. For example, on 1 January 2021, the ICC introduced new procedures by
updating key provisions in its arbitration rules. The new Article 26 reads as follows:
A hearing shall be held if any of the parties so requests or, failing such a request,
if the arbitral tribunal on its own motion decides to hear the parties. When a
hearing is to be held, the arbitral tribunal, giving reasonable notice, shall
summon the parties to appear before it on the day and at the place fixed by it.
The arbitral tribunal may decide, after consulting the parties, and on the basis of
the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, that any hearing will be
conducted by physical attendance or remotely by videoconference, telephone or
other appropriate means of communication.105
The 2017 ICC rules had not expressly accounted for the option to pursue remote/digital
arbitration hearings. This latest addition in 2021 has been a natural development of the
experiences gathered during the covid-19 arbitral landscape. Whether the discretion is given
ipso facto or following successfully consulting with the parties is more cumbersome to discern.
In the expedited arbitration context, I would argue that the matter is pretty clear – the sole
arbitrator can decide to conduct the hearing by written exchanges (if due process allows), let
alone via a digital/remote hearing (if due process allows). I would even take it one step further
and argue that digital expedited arbitration should be the new default procedure for low-value,
less complex disputes at the ICC. More arbitral institutions may follow-suit and we may soon
live in a world where digital expedited arbitration is the default procedure.

6. Concluding Remarks
ICA’s initial success as an informal, speedy, and cost-efficient transborder dispute
resolution mechanism is undeniable. However, today, the procedure has largely become
judicialized, and therefore ill-liked by many and applauded by others. Both sides have merit in
their claim to authority. I believe that the evolution towards an arbitral trial was inevitable as
courts were asked to approve the procedure by sanctioning the outcome of arbitral decisionmaking and with it “private justice”. Thus, as domestic courts were asked to shake-off its
traditional hostility towards ICA, the procedure had to meet litigators and judges half-way by
amending the procedure. Put simply, there were concessions on both sides and with approval
came conditions of “judicial maturity”.
In the early 90’s, Professor Carbonneau was a forefront figure in this debate. Already
then, he had cautioned against judicialization and any such reform that does not align with the
fundamental elements of ICA. Following ICA’s widespread usage, Carbonneau expressed his
reduced mission as follows:
My ask is no longer to arrest a locomotive proceeding down the tracks at full
throttle. I can only try to convince the engineer to slow the train to a pace at
which an accounting of its direction can take place. As reduced as my mission
has become, it still smacks of the impossible. My legs can hardly propel me to
the speed demanded by the chase. My cries are barely audible in the rush of air
105 Article 26, 2021 ICC Rules.
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that follows in the train’s passage. My signals of caution are confused with errant
sparks and extinguished as quickly.106
Carbonneau was ahead of his time in spotting an adverse trend, which he articulated so
eloquently in several papers and book contributions.107 Meanwhile, law firms and service
providers were occupied with capitalizing on fueling the dispute resolution demand with costly
litigation features, but yet with high quality legal services. The users wanted to win and wanted
aggressively skillful lawyers on their side. Eventually, the scope of the arbitral competence was
inevitable too and the subject-matter inarbitrability doctrine became less and less prevalent.
Arbitrators were considered competent to handle statutory claims and other complex matters
traditionally falling outside the realm of ICA. Thus, ICA had “passed from the state of nature
to life in a civilized society, and in the process ha[d] acquired many of the trappings of the
dysfunctional judicial trial—an omen perhaps of its ultimate fate.”108 Meanwhile, the increased
quality of the ICA procedure was, too, undeniable, making it harder (if not impossible) to
downplay its righteous entrance for complex and high-stake ICA disputes. All in all, there can
be no denial of the fact that the American trial techniques widened the lawyers’ toolkit in this
now highly contentious and adversarial setting. American law firms were highly sought after to
win in arbitration, at any price. More than that, there can be no denial of the fact that it has
partly been for the better, yet not exclusively so.
Thus, even if the arbitral trial is considered to be “better” than expedited arbitration from
a quality standpoint, it may still be unproportionally so for certain types of disputes and for
certain types of commercial parties. As eloquently explained by one author: “expedited
arbitration may be the only commercially realistic arbitration option for SMEs in many
instances and despite its limits, it is certainly better to have access to imperfect justice than to
no justice at all.”109
The architects of building an adjudicatory civilization through ICA (e.g., the ICC)
understood this when partaking in elaborating the institution of transborder arbitration. The
same visionaries are now increasingly working to re-meet the calls for a “de-judicialized”
arbitral alternative. In responding to the customers’ demands and expectations, ICC and other
arbitral service providers have turned expedited arbitration into the default procedure and the
UNCITRAL has set-up an entire working group dedicated to elaborating on expedited
arbitration rules.
With that said, no one perfect dispute resolution venue will be discovered. Not a single
dispute resolution regime will be able to meet all demands and expectations. This is even more
so in the transnational context. Professor Carbonneau once wrote that the “work of
intermediating between different concepts of the trial and justice and tailoring remedies to
human needs remains unfinished.”110 In the experience of human-life, I am afraid to say that
the work of adjudicatory perfection will remain an ongoing and unfinished project forever.
Time and context turn demand into a pendulum that swings with the winds of contemporary
106 CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 125.
107 See e.g., chapters in id. → what pages?
108 Id. at 127.
109 Larusson, supra note 19, at 179.
110 CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 141; FOX, supra note 2, at 88.
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wants and needs. However, for the winds of today, (digital) expedited arbitration will provide
for an effective recourse to redress many commercial grievances, in particular for SMEs in lowvalue and less complex disputes. All in all, (digital) expedited arbitration helps respond to the
perceived shortcomings of the arbitral trial by offering a procedurally compelling, yet cost- and
speed efficient, alternative to it.
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